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Abstract: The overall objective of this article is to demonstrate that 
in applied ethics, certain problems related to decision-making are easier 
to resolve using conceptual tools borrowed from mathematics than by 
using philosophical ethics theories, such as classical utilitarianism. With 
the help of a case study, the first part of the article will attempt to point 
out that if an agent bases his reasoning on the verbal and purely qualitative 
concepts of the classical utilitarian theory, he will find himself confront-
ing “undecidable” dilemmas for which making a specific choice rather 
than another, becomes almost arbitrary. The second part of the article 
proposes a more formal quantification of utility and attitude towards risk 
that can help the agent to overcome the uncertainties emanating from a 
strictly qualitative perception of the real world’s configuration, which 
ends up confusing his practical judgment. This method for decision-
making is inspired by the works of Howard Raiffa, John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern.
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Generally, the reasoning that guides ethical decisions uses two distinc-
tive approaches: it can focus on a certain state of the world produced 
through action – including the different mental states of the agent -, or it 
can concentrate itself on the processes, which, if looked at beforehand, 
can promote “just” or “good” actions. In the first case, the reasoning 
proceeds by maximization of a predefined magnitude. This is the strategy 
employed by classical utilitarianism. By first defining goodness – pleasure, 
well-being or happiness – it then needs to be maximized in terms of costs 
resulting from the foreseeable consequences of each action. In the second 
case, the agent’s approach is mostly concerned by the introduction of 
formal constraints which, when applied to reasoning or institutions, favor 
the achievement of various behaviors considered acceptable from a nor-
mative point of view.1 This approach is primarily associated with deon-
tological theories like those of Kant and Rawls. 
These two modes of reasoning are so common in ethics that they are, 
to this day, still widely used in various fields that go beyond mere philo-
sophical or ethical thought. However, when it comes to solving somewhat 
complex practical problems, social ethics is limited by the lack of specifi-
cation of the conceptual tools it uses. Too often, the mode of reasoning 
proposed by ethical theory is so broad and imprecise that the agents have 
no other choice but to leave behind their rational analysis and thus, rely 
on their intuitive morals – or basically, on their instinct. In practical life, 
the value of intuition or of sentiment should not be disdained. It must, 
however, remain peripheral as much as possible, when it comes to ad-
dressing problems in which agents must process a considerable volume 
of information while applying a rigorous analytical method.
The limits of qualitative and purely verbal thought in social ethics 
appear in at least two recurring dimensions of decision-making: the ag-
gregation of utility and the evaluation of risk.2 The first part of the article 
will attempt to point out that if an agent bases his reasoning on the verbal 
concepts of the classical utilitarian theory, he will find himself confront-
ing “undecidable” dilemmas for which making a specific choice rather 
than another, becomes almost arbitrary. The second part will propose an 
alternative method overcoming the obstacles presented in the first part. 
1 On consequences of this approach concerning questions of justice, see: Sen A., 
(2009) The Idea of Justice. London: Penguin Books.
2 Since it is presumed later on in the article that probabilities are assignable to events, 
the term risk, in this case, is privileged.
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Thus, the overall objective of this paper is as follows: to demonstrate that 
a slightly more formal quantification of utility and attitude towards risk 
can help the agent overcome the uncertainties emanating from a strictly 
qualitative perception of the real world’s configuration, which ends up 
confusing his practical judgment. In what lies ahead, the proposed ap-
proach aims to take conceptual tools, which were originally conceived 
for economics and applied mathematics, and implant them into the field 
of social ethics. We will now tackle these two aspects of decision-making 
by attempting, for each of them, to prove that there are indeed alternative 
forms of quantification. These help the agent specify his choices in contexts 
where social ethics would usually leave him in a blur of despair.
THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION WITHIN CLASSICAL 
UTILITARIANISM
The classical utility theory, as developed by Jeremy Bentham and 
later on by John Stuart Mill, includes three basic components for decision-
making: a definition of “good” (teleological axis), an imperative (maxi-
mization), and other specific principles meant to weigh out preferences. 
These aspects are derived from a very attractive philosophical anthropol-
ogy from which the two Anglo-Saxon authors expose what they believe 
are the most powerful motives of human action.
In this theory, the good, seen as an assessable magnitude, relates to the 
intensity of pleasure and to the minimization of pain, perceived here as 
a negative quantity.3 To this general finality (telos), is added an imperative 
(an obligation) which determines the agent’s rule of action: to maximize 
happiness for the greatest number.4 Finally, the works of Bentham and 
Mill will also provide criteria facilitating the balancing of pleasures and 
the calculation of various utilities. For Bentham, we find a series of seven 
criteria allowing a quantification of pleasure under an arithmetic form. 
3 The problem with the measurability of welfare is already very old in economics. 
To read about a few classic contributions on this topic see: Robbins L. (1938) Inter-
personal Comparisons of Utility; a Comment. In Economic Journal, 43 (December), 
pp. 635-641; Marshall A. (1949) Principles of Economics 8th ed. (New York: The 
MacMillan co.); Hicks J.R. (1939) The foundations of Welfare Economics. Eco-
nomic Journal, 49 (December), pp. 696-700.
4 See preface: Bentham J. A Fragment on Government, which was brought to 
attention anonymously in London in 1776.
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The criteria are the following: 1) intensity, 2) duration, 3) certainty, 4) 
proximity, 5) productiveness, 6) purity, 7) extent.5 According to these 
criteria, an intense pleasure, with a sure and long duration would be 
preferable to a fleeting, uncertain pleasure, and so forth. While Mill devi-
ates from the quantitative view of Bentham, he also offers a way to cal-
culate different forms of pleasure with a qualitative vision. For example, 
according to Mill, some intellectual or aesthetic pleasures, even if felt less 
intensely than sensual pleasures can be more satisfactory.6 
DECISION MAKING WITH THE HELP OF THE CLASSICAL UTILITY 
THEORY
To this day, the three components of Bentham and Mill’s utility 
theory – but especially the first two – are used to analyze ethical choices 
in many areas. Clearly, throughout the decades, various critiques were 
formulated against one or the other of the theory’s foundation. The 
objective here is not to review them all. Among these critiques, many of 
them focus on the difficulty of evaluating, within a set of options, which 
one corresponds most accurately to the principle of the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. In fact, for the agent who wishes to make a deci-
sion by using the utility theory, he is quickly confronted with the un-
comfortable assignment of evaluating mental states that are variable in 
time, but also from one individual to another.7 This issue, recognized in 
philosophy and economics, is known as the aggregation and the inter-
personal comparison of utilities.8
5 Bentham. An introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
6 See: Mill J.S. Utilitarianism, chapter 2.
7 Bentham himself recognized this difficulty up until a certain point. See section 
on this topic in: Arrow K.J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd ed. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, p. 23 n.
8 The amount of literature on this topic is vast. For an overview in philosophy, 
economics and applied ethics see, amongst many, the following: Pettit P. (ed.) (1993) 
Consequentialism. Aldershot: Dartmouth pub.; Parfit D.(1978) Inumerate Ethics. 
Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7 (4), pp. 285-301; Taurek J.M. (1977) 
Should the Numbers Count?. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6 (4), pp. 293-316; Kah-
neman D. et al. (1997) Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility. The 
Quaterky Journal of Economics, 112 (2), pp. 375-405; Daniels N. and Sabin J.E. 
(2002) Setting Limits Fairly. New York: Oxford University Press.
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To demonstrate the limits of the application of classical utilitarianism 
in applied ethics as well as the advantages of introducing quantification 
techniques, what follows in this paper is a case study. The case study is 
fictitious. However, its structure corresponds to what is found in many 
situations in applied ethics. Thus, its heuristic scope is relatively extended. 
The case tells the story of a public servant working for the Ministry of 
Public Security. As part of his duties, he was asked to evaluate the permis-
sion to grant the conditional liberation of Nero, a powerful gang lord 
who, just a few years back, had the whole community terrorized. Ac-
cording to the social psychological expert evaluation that the public serv-
ant analyzed, the criminal received sufficient therapy to change the risks 
of recurrence from “significant” to “moderate”. The official knew, 
however, that upon his arrest 10 years ago, the criminal had sworn to 
commit significantly damaging crimes when released from prison. Mean-
while, after several budget cuts, the official’s superior had demanded the 
liberation of more prisoners in order to reduce the Ministry’s expenses. 
In light of this, the employee’s professional experience as well as his 
moral intuition, did not encourage him to grant parole. In his opinion, 
even if the risk had significantly decreased, the consequences of a recur-
rence would be disastrous. Nevertheless, the employer was a very impe-
rious man and the public servant couldn’t help thinking about the pre-
cariousness of his non-permanent working status. He was afraid of not 
being able to feed his family. He was absolutely torn and in need of all 
the necessary resources to be able to use good ethical reasoning about the 
issue for he would certainly not want to be wrong. What should he have 
done: grant Nero’s liberation or keep him behind bars?9
Even for an ethical problem with a moderate level of complexity like 
this one, the shortcomings of the classical utility theory rapidly become 
apparent. First, the theory does not indicate with much clarity about how 
to balance personal utility and overall utility of the consequences attached 
to an action. From the principle of greatest happiness for the greatest 
number, it is difficult to achieve a fair balance between the intensity fac-
tor of the “greatest happiness” and the expansion factor of the “greatest 
number”. Even if the agent does not wish to act in an egotistical manner, 
9 The reader is cautioned not to consider the realism of this situation or keep track 
of the current legislation in criminal law. The reasoning must be based solely on in-
formation provided in the example. In any case, once the method is acquired, it is 
possible to apply it to other contexts with differing information. 
Ramon Llull Journal_05_2014.indd   27 29/05/14   11:43
28 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2014. ISSUE 5 PP. 23-40
the fact remains that according to Bentham’s calculating criteria, the 
certain and the immediate are preferable to the distant and the uncertain. 
In our example, the sum of the possible dangers affecting the population 
if Nero were to satisfy his criminal instincts, are considerable. Who would 
be affected and to what extent? In his case, the public servant also under-
stands very well the consequences involving the relationship between his 
employer and himself and those concerning the loss of his job. Indeed, 
these consequences concern but a small amount of people (his family and 
himself), which does not undermine his perception of their immediacy 
and certainty. 
Furthermore, when the ratio of two effects equally produce intensities 
of pleasure or displeasure, it is the likelihood of their realization that 
makes the difference. In other words, at equal intensity, a highly likely 
consequence will be of greater importance than a consequence of low 
probability. However, how to calculate probabilities from a sum of 
purely qualitative judgments? If you put yourself in the employee’s place, 
how do you add up several probabilities that are not quantified? In his 
reasoning, the employee must calculate the overall utility linked to Nero’s 
liberation, and do the same with the option of keeping Nero behind bars. 
He would then select the option of the dilemma that overall would be 
more useful. See, in table 1 below, the type of analysis he can do with the 
conceptual tools developed by the classical utilitarianism. 
The analysis showed in table 1 recaps the most striking aspects of the 
qualitative analysis of the ethical problem experienced by the public serv-
Table 1
OPTION A: NERO’S LIBERATION
Consequences =
people affected + intensity + probability
OPTION B: LEAVE NERO  
IN PRISON
Consequences =
people affected + intensity + probability
Severe criminal actions menacing public 
security. Indeterminate amount of 
people affected. Moderate probability.
Decrease of criminality and menace to 
public security. Very high probability. 
Employer’s satisfaction. Job kept and 
capacity to nurture family met. Very 
high probability. 
Conflicts with boss. Job loss. Economic 
insecurity risk for the whole family. 
Somewhat high probability.
Remorse and feeling of deceiving the 
ethical and professional integrity re-
quirements. Very high probability. 
Feeling of an accomplished duty. Very 
high probability. 
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ant. The tension arises mainly with the opposition between the em-
ployee’s personal interest in wanting keep his job and the professional 
duty inciting him to see the problem with a broader perspective – public 
protection. When the consequences and their probabilities have been 
established, how does the calculation go forth? The two options present 
consequences that are equivalent in their intensity. If Nero is released, 
the potential significant criminal acts added to remorse give the option a 
very important negative intensity. The fact that many people can be 
victims of Nero’s actions adds an extension factor to this negative inten-
sity. On the other hand, the possibility of keeping his job, eliminating 
tensions with the boss and fulfilling the family’s needs is a very powerful 
result that is hard to ignore. This tension between positive and negative 
consequences also occurs if Nero stays in prison, only in reverse. In short, 
the mere comparison of the intensity of the consequences appended to 
the options does not promote a clear, rational choice. 
The review of the probabilities expressed qualitatively hardly facilitates 
the choice. The degree of difficulty would undoubtedly be multiplied 
were the number of options greater. In option A’s column, there are two 
“fairly high” probabilities and one “moderate” probability whereas in 
option B’s column, we have two probabilities that are “very high” and 
one that is “fairly high”. In terms of probability, there is therefore a slight 
advantage for option B. However, we must not overlook the average 
probability associated to a severe consequence – the possibility of Nero’s 
criminal acts touching a large portion of the population. This reasoning, 
which is based on a qualitative evaluation, brings us to a dead-end. In this 
case, it would seem that the final decision ultimately rests on the public 
servant’s personality, on subjective intuition made up of an accumulation 
of temporal experiences which cannot be expressed as a mature and ex-
plicitly justifiable choice. 
THE PROBLEM WITH UNCERTAINTY AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK
The difficulty of considering the probabilities of consequences through 
a qualitative reasoning method is not the only problem with the classical 
utilitarian approach. If we integrate the notion of the attitude of the agent 
towards risk to the framework defined earlier, the choice becomes even 
more complex. Actually, integrating many qualitatively defined probabil-
ities does not suffice. The particular psychological personality coming from 
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the type of agent involved also adds itself to the equation. In the end, the 
ethical choice is made by, on one hand, objective considerations fundamen-
tally linked to the values attributed to the consequences (monetary value, 
social norms, probabilities, etc), and on the other, by subjective consid-
erations linked to certain dispositions, beliefs and attitudes. Yet, in a selec-
tion process which aims to be as accurate as possible, what should we think 
of an evaluation resulting from the agent’s fear, audacity or temerity?
The attitude towards risk is capital because it can substantially modify 
the agent’s calculation of the objective aspects of an uncertain conse-
quence.10 For example, it may be that the public servant considers option 
A of his dilemma (Nero’s liberation) as the most favorable because he 
cannot live with the thought of provoking his boss or losing his income. 
This result, even if it is unasserted, would give the agent the impression 
of total loss. Meanwhile, if the public servant has a flare for risk, and since 
we saw that his professional duty is finely tuned, he could ignore the job 
loss consequence and choose to follow his good professional judgment 
which indicates him not to grant the liberation of a dangerous criminal 
like Nero. 
If we go back to table 1, how will the agent integrate the risk factor 
in the ethical evaluation of the dilemma? Should there be another criteria 
which would specify the interval of fear or confidence associated to each 
consequence and its probabilities? In this case, the problems with aggregat-
ing qualitative data are accentuated since new margins are being introduced. 
How do we “average out” the objective aspects of one consequence and 
the personal beliefs of the agent? Classical utilitarianism does not help us 
in answering these questions. To avoid this dead-end, the problem’s 
analysis will be resumed by a more mathematical method inspired by 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgensterns’s work on game theory, 
as well as Howard Raiffa’s work on decision-making.11
10 A criticism of the same nature is elaborated by Harsanyi and directed towards 
John Rawls’s principle of the maximin. See: Harsanyi J.C. (1975) Can the Maximin 
Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?. American Political Science Review, 69 (6), 
pp. 594-606. The works of Harsanyi are by far a significative contribution to the 
modernization of the utilitarian ethical theory. 
11 Von Neumann J. and Morgenstern O. (2004) Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behaviour. 60th anniversary ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Raiffa 
H., Richardson J. and Metcalfe D. (2007) Negotiation Analysis. The Science and Art 
of Collaborative Decision-Making. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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QUANTIFICATION OF ETHICAL REASONING WITH THE 
EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL.
The method exposed in what follows applies itself to a single agent 
(person, company, government, etc.). Once the problem’s options and 
their respective consequences are defined, the ethical problem’s analysis 
is then quantified. First, the numbered value of each consequence and 
their likelihood is determined. Second, the desirability of the consequence 
and the attitude towards risk are evaluated. In this way, the agent takes 
into account both the “objective” values which he associates to each 
consequence and the consideration of his own desires and beliefs. 
MONETARY VALUE AND PROBABILITY
The method’s first step consists of measuring the consequence’s util-
ity by attributing a monetary value to it. Evidently, this exercise is 
partly subjective since it demonstrates the agent’s tastes, but it is also 
objective in so far as the value of goods often results in recognized social 
conventions (example: the value of goods and services). If the monetary 
value is not defined and the agent wishes to transform the qualitative 
value of a consequence into a quantitative value, he can do so by asking 
himself this question: how much money would I be willing to spend to 
have this consequence manifest itself or, on the contrary, be avoided? The 
agent is including an essential step in what is referred to as the cardinal 
measuring of utility.12 In the exposed case study, for every consequence 
of option A, the public servant asks himself these questions: 1) What 
amount of my money would I be willing to pay to avoid newly commit-
ted crimes by Nero?13 2) What amount of my money would I be willing 
to pay to keep my job and to maintain a good relationship with my boss? 
3) What amount of my money would I be ready to spend to avoid the 
12 The notion of cardinal utility distinguishes itself from the notion of ordinal 
utility. Cardinal utility is generally understood as being the intensity of pleasure expe-
rienced by the agent at the time of a consequence’s realization. As for ordinal utility, 
it is the result of classification of preferences concerning various consequences managed 
by the agent. 
13 In this case, the monetary value is accounted as a negative magnitude since it 
represents a negative consequence for the public servant. All negative consequences 
will thereby be considered as negative magnitudes. 
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remorse of having not fulfilled my professional obligations? Once all the 
monetary values are attributed to the consequences of option A, the agent 
repeats the procedure for option B. After carefully analyzing the problem, 
the public servant obtains values which are summarized in the diagram 
below. Obviously, these evaluations are subjective and can vary consider-
ably from one agent to the next. It is important to note here, that the 
primary objective is to understand the quantification technique, as such, 
in so far as it allows the agent to make commensurable choices – the same 
choices which would have been almost impossible to evaluate from 
solely qualitative judgments. 
Although it is not always the case, in this example, the consequences 
of each option are almost symmetrical in their form, but not in their 
values. Thus, as in the qualitative analysis, monetary values alone do not 
lead to a clear choice. The global utility is quite similar for the two op-
tions. For the analysis to progress, the qualitative judgments of the prob-
abilities associated to each consequence must be quantified. All probabil-
ity finds itself on a 0 to 1 scale in which 0 corresponds to an impossible 
consequence, and 1 corresponds to a certain consequence. The probabil-
ities of each consequence are portrayed in table 2. If, for each consequence, 
we multiply the monetary value by the probability, we obtain the ex-
pected monetary value. The sum of the expected monetary values indicates 
the expected monetary value for each option.14
In our example, the calculation gives us these following results:
14 To see more on these notions, see: Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe, op. cit., pp. 
23-24.
Table 2
OPTION A OPTION B
Monetary Value Probability Monetary Value Probability
Consequence 1A = 
–8,000$
0.5 Consequence 1B = 5,000$ 0.95
Consequence 2A = 6,000$ 0.95 Consequence 2B = 
–10,000$
0.8
Consequence 3A = 
–2,000$
0.9 Consequence 3B = 2,000$ 1
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– Expected monetary value for option A = (0.5 × –8,000$) + 
(0.95 × 6,000$) + (0.9 × –2,000$) = –100$.
– Expected monetary value for option B = (0.95 × 5000$) + (0.8 
× –10,000$) + (1 × 2,000$) = –1,250$
Contrasting the trend that was previously observed, the integration of 
the quantified data exposes, for the first time, a clear advantage for option 
A. However, the suspense of the final decision is yet to come since there 
are still a few more steps to reach a comprehensive analysis of the problem. 
DESIRABILITY, RISK AND EXPECTED UTILITY
Already, the quantification of the ethical analysis encourages a better 
understanding of the problem and shows that options A and B are less 
symmetrical than what the qualitative assessment suggests. Nevertheless, 
as it has been previously suggested, it is still possible to go deeper into the 
analysis by using a model that helps systemize the agent’s “interiority” 
which he expresses through his desires, his attitudes and beliefs. The 
previous steps focused on the events, while these following steps examine 
what is happening within the agent as he is confronted by the ethical 
problem’s data. 
According to Raiffa, the monetary value that the agent attaches to a 
consequence is not necessarily proportional to the desire he feels in front 
of the consequence. This is particularly true when the monetary value is 
objective and not dependant on the agent’s taste. However, the desirabil-
ity is a fundamental dimension of cardinal utility measuring because it in-
dicates the intensity of the agent’s preferences.15 For example, if it is obvi-
ous that the monetary value of a Ferrari 458 Italia is much higher than that 
of a Toyota Prius, it is possible to perceive the agent’s desirability for the 
second choice as being stronger – that is, if he has an ecological tendency 
or dislikes bling. Yet, there is more. Desirability also measures the real 
impact of a good or of a consequence affecting the agent. For most people, 
15 On this topic, there is no consensus on the employed terminology. For more 
precisions, see amongst others: Fisher I. (1918) Is Utility the Most Suitable Term for 
the Concept It is Used to Denote?. American Economic Review, 8, pp. 335-337; 
Fishburn P.C. (1989) Retrospective on the Utility Theory of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, pp. 127-158. 
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winning one million dollars is extraordinary; for Bill Gates, it is pretty 
banal. Consequently, it is sometimes preferable, says Raiffa, to add a desir-
ability factor to the calculation of the monetary value.16 Desirability is 
represented by a number between 0 and 100 – 100 being the highest degree 
of desirability and 0, the lowest. In the example of the public servant, the 
monetary values are the direct expression of the agent’s desires. Desirabil-
ity is therefore proportionate to monetary values and so we can exclude it 
from our calculations as it will not contribute any extra information.17 
Once the agent has identified his preferences and their intensity by 
attributing a monetary value to them, he must go through another step 
to conclude the utilitarian reasoning. Even if two agents can agree on the 
consequences which, in their view, are most desirable, it is far from certain 
that they will agree on what they are willing to risk to see the conse-
quences manifest themselves. The variable of this decision lies in the at-
titude towards risk. We have seen that in a qualitative type of reasoning, 
the risk factor seriously affects the complexity of the ethical problem’s 
analysis. Hence the question: how can we integrate it to the rest of the 
quantification of the decision-making process?
Again, numerous authors have dwelled on the question of modeling 
decisions in risk contexts. However, following Raiffa,18 the ethical analy-
sis method elaborated in the later part of this essay will reflect John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s ideas proposed in Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior. Thus, when the utility of a consequence depends 
not only on its intrinsic value or desirability, but also on the risk factor 
(odds and beliefs) that is appended to it, the agent’s choice will take the 
form of a lottery. Indeed, like all uncertain consequences, the lottery pro-
duces a certain gain factor – X, with a probability – p. For example, if the 
rule of the lottery specifies that I will obtain 10$ if, by rolling a die, I get 
a six, this means that X is equal to 10$ and therefore p is equivalent to 1/6. 
This data will help characterize the lottery and calculate its utility. Accord-
ing to Neumann and Morgenstern, when faced with the core of this situ-
ation, the agent – if he is rational – will search a way to maximize the 
expected utility. Consequently, between two lotteries, he will choose the 
16 Raiffa et al., op. cit., pp. 24-26.
17 If we apply the desirability notion to the example of the public servant, the results 
would be the following: the consequence 2A would have the highest degree of desir-
ability (100) and the consequence 2B would have the lowest degree of desirability (0).
18 Raiffa et al., op. cit., pp. 27-32.
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one whose expected gain is the highest. In the context of ethical decision, 
the concept of lottery is therefore used to model choice within a risk 
context. Altogether, it is an analogy of realistic bets which an agent must 
sometimes make when he finds himself in front of an uncertain future.19 
Through the acceptance of certain postulates or axioms20 that reflect 
the consistency of the agent, it becomes possible to reformulate the data 
of the ethical problem in the form of lotteries. The utility calculated by 
this method is called expected utility or von Neumann-Morgenstern’s 
utility (vNM). The first consistency or rationality postulates are considered 
natural.21 They may be conformed to the rules of logic usually employed 
by an agent when he reasons with different choices. In fact, these assump-
tions provide the agent with the stability and reproducibility of his pref-
erences. In this way it is possible to make “understandable” choices, which 
is to say, choices that are rationally justifiable and predictable. These 
postulates are also necessary for the establishment of formal preference 
profiles referred to here as utility function. 
The first of these postulates requires the formulation of preferences in 
the form of a complete pre-order.22 This concept states that within a set 
of consequences, the agent can compare all 23 consequences by pairing 
them up two by two. He can then establish that, if he prefers consequence 
19 In economics literature, many authors believe that von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s notion of expected utility does not describe realistically the agent’s behavior in 
risk contexts. For example, this was the case for the French economist, Maurice Allais. 
This essay does not strive to take position on the matter, but rather suggests the cal-
culation of utility according to vNM is a practical conceptual tool for decision making 
in applied ethics.
20 These postulates have been criticized by numerous authors. Since this article 
does not make its case on their critical examination, the reader can consult the vast 
literature dedicated to this subject. See: Fishburn P.C. (1970) Utility Theory for Deci-
sion Making. New York: Wiley; Machina M.J. (1982) Expected Utility : Analysis 
without the Independance Axiom. Econometric, 50 (2), pp. 277-323; and more re-
cently Risse M. (2002) Harsanyi’s ‘Utilitarian Theorem’ and Utilitarianism. Noûs, 
36 (4), pp. 550-577.
21 It should be noted that the following presentation is an informal interpretation 
of the formal demonstration conceptually originating from von Neumann and Mor-
genstern.
22 On this topic, see: Harsanyi J.C. (1978) Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitar-
ian Ethics. American Economic Review, 68 (2), pp. 223-228.
23 For some authors, including Amartya Sen, this requirement is too strong and is 
not necessary to ensure the consistency of choice. For details, see: Sen A. (2001) Ra-
tionality and Freedom. Harvard: Harvard Belknap Press.
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x to consequence y, and y to z, he therefore prefers x to z.24 The second 
assumption is very important for modeling. Under this assumption, if 
lottery Q ranks, in terms of preferences, between two other lotteries – 
let’s say P and R, it is thus possible to reconstruct lottery Q as a lottery 
formed by P and R while keeping its preference order. This is a continu-
ity postulate. The third postulate is also essential for what follows. It is a 
substitution25 postulate. This postulate provides two forms of equiva-
lence.26 On one hand, whether they are composite or single,27 the utility 
of the two lotteries which have equal expectations of gain will be deemed 
equally preferable by an agent.28 The physical process that produces a 
result is not important. What counts, is the result itself. On the other 
hand, at the end of a calculation method which we will now explain, the 
probability of a lottery is the direct expression of its utility.29
The technique von Neumann and Morgenstern propose is clever and 
very useful in applied ethics. For the modeling of the ethical problem to 
simultaneously reflect the probabilities, the desirability and the attitude 
towards risk, the agent must transform the consequentialist qualitative 
analysis into a lottery characterized by a certain gain expectancy. From 
a psychological standpoint, we find in this mathematical procedure the 
idea that the decision in front of risk is pulled from one extreme to the 
other: the temptation to make a significant gain or the deception of an 
important loss. The risk-seeking agent will be more attentive to the lot-
tery’s promise of gain, whereas the risk-averse agent, will be more preoc-
cupied by the potential losses. To create a lottery, the best consequence 
of the considered option must be first identified, followed by the identi-
fication of the worst. We must then link these consequences to their 
24 The order is qualified here as transitive. This axiom also presupposes the com-
parability of the options.
25 In various writings, this postulate is also described as an independence axiom.
26 This explanation is borrowed from Binmore’s work. See: Binmore K. (1992) 
Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. London: DC Heath.
27 A composed lottery is one in which the prizes are themselves the lottery. Ac-
cording to the substitution postulate, a composed lottery can be brought back to a 
simple lottery by calculating the total probability. See Binmore, op. cit.
28 Evidently, this excludes any case in which the “player” is not primarily moti-
vated by the results, but rather by the mere pleasure of playing. After all, if the fun of 
the game were not sometimes stronger than the systemic research of results, Las Vegas 
would be bankrupted!
29 Binmore offers an excellent summary of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
demonstration. See Binmore, op. cit.
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monetary value thus exposing either the benefits (gains) promised by the 
lottery, or the losses. This lottery is graded Q; the superior prize (the 
“gain”) is graded G and the inferior prize is graded L. Each lottery is 
defined by the set [G, L]. Next, the agent must identify – within the 
interval [G, L],30 the amount which, to him, seems to be an “average 
desirability”. That is to say a desirability of 50 on an interval [0,100].31 
This amount is very significant as it helps measure, specifically, the agent’s 
attitude towards risk. We will see why later in the presentation. 
Now, putting ourselves in the public servant’s shoes, we must compare 
the options to construct the lottery and ask ourselves these following 
questions: what is the best outcome I can achieve from choosing one or 
another option? And which is the worst? For the model to adequately 
reflect the ethical choice, it is important to grasp the tension between the 
temptation for gain and the great loss that would result if the worst con-
sequence were to occur. By establishing beforehand the monetary value 
and the desirability, we’ve already gone through this exercise. In option 
A, the best consequence for the public servant is keeping his job (2A), 
and the worst one is Nero’s recidivism (1A). The sum of the lots would 
therefore be {6000, –8000}. This lottery structure indicates that should 
he choose option A, the public servant would want, above all, to keep 
his job, but he would have to accept the risk of Nero’s recidivism. In-
versely, should he choose option B, the public servant opts for the idea 
of avoiding public security threats (1B) while risking his job (2B). For 
option B, the sum of the lots would therefore be {5000, –10000}. The 
final choice will result in the comparison of option A and B’s lotteries.32 
In the interval {6000, –8000}, we will assume that the average desirabil-
ity grade is –1000$. This amount signifies that the public servant feels 
indifferent about choosing either option whether it be that of paying 
1000$ from his pocket or that of participating in a lottery. In the interval 
{5000, –10000}, the desirability’s average is set at –2500$. 
To determine the probability – and therefore the utility33 – associated 
to each lottery deriving from the consequences, the agent must first ask 
30 Contrarily to the group that contains only elements G and L, the interval includes 
all values between G and L. 
31 See footnote 16 for further explanation.
32 This model choice seems closer to a common type of reasoning. In real life, the 
agent would compare the risks and gains of each option and do likewise for the two 
lotteries.
33 This results from the substitution postulate that was defined earlier. 
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himself this question: what would have to be the probability attributed 
to lottery Q’s gain to incite me to change X amount of my consequence 
in exchange for a ticket allowing me to participate in the lottery? Nor-
mally, if the agent is risk-neutral, the average desirability scale will cor-
respond to a 0,5 probability. This means that he would be indifferent to 
choosing between the option of paying 1000$ (or 2500$ for option B) 
and the option of participating in the lottery. However, if the agent is 
timorous, he would even be willing to pay a substantial amount to avoid 
the risk of loosing prize L of the lottery. After, the agent must repeat the 
process and ask himself that same question for each of the dilemma’s 
consequence. The ingenuity of the procedure comes from the fact that 
by asking this question, the agent not only compares utilities and prob-
abilities. He also assesses how far he is willing to go to see the realization 
of the consequence for which he cares most. The obtained probability 
for each consequence becomes a way to measure the lottery’s utility while 
taking into account the attitude towards risk. It is then multiplied by the 
probability, in table 2, to which the consequence’s realization is attribut-
ed.34 The multiplication’s result is the consequence’s expected utility. The 
sum of the expected utilities for each option’s consequence gives us the 
total of the expected utility of an option. 
Here are the results of the consequences transformed into lotteries. 
The reader can refer to the tables 1 and 2 for further details. Note that 
in table 3, the number associated to the consequence is the probability 
determined by the agent in a range between 0 and 100. 
As was reported earlier, to calculate the expected utilities of each result, 
the utility noted in table 3 must be multiplied by the consequence’s prob-
ability and each option’s results are to be added. This is the calculation in 
brackets in table 3. We now have all the necessary data to go ahead with 
the two option’s comparison within a utilitarian perspective. In light of 
these results, we can observe that, with an ethical point of view, the most 
desirable option for the state employee is option B – not granting Nero’s 
liberation. The method makes it possible to aggregate all of the problem’s 
data and end up with a clear choice, which was not the case with a 
purely qualitative analysis. This can easily be experienced: the qualitative 
34 It is important to understand here the difference between each probability. The 
one from table 2 is an “objective” evaluation of the possibility of seeing the outcome 
of a consequence while the other integrates a measurement of the agent’s desire in a 
risk context.
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judgment becomes hazy when a large amount of information is to be 
considered. The quantification of the problem promotes, instead, a more 
accurate model that encourages the agent to distance himself from the 
ambivalence generated by a fixation on the qualitative data of his dilemma. 
THE DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH ASSURE THE CHOICE’S 
ETHICALITY 
Obviously, for some critics of utilitarianism, the “ ethicality “ of such 
a decision is never guaranteed as it is based on determinants, such as desir-
ability, which may be contaminated by personal interest. The addition 
of what might be called deontological “constraints” could create a proce-
dural “lock” of some sort which would secure the decision-making process. 
This issue alone would require another article. Harsanyi and other authors, 
have suggested solutions to this problem.35 If we refer to Kantian’s ideal, 
the essence of deontological ethics obliges the agent to a certain form of 
universality through which the agent’s actions must obey to principles 
of symmetry between agents, impartiality towards his own interests, and 
exemplarity. The integration of these constraints to the model proposed 
in this paper is not an easy task. Through his notion of the categorical 
imperative, Kant placed more emphasis on the formal properties of prac-
tical reasoning. However, it is difficult to make choices and respect these 
properties without considering the consequences that these choices pro-
duce. The introduction of ethical constraints would probably require a 
closer look at the issue of distribution of utilities, since this question reflects 
the moral status of agents in a community. This issue therefore calls for 
the definition of principles of justice. Clearly, this goes beyond the scope 
35 See Harsanyi, op. cit., p. 226-228.
Table 3
OPTION A OPTION B
Consequence 1A = 0.01 (x 0.5 = 0.01) Consequence 1B = 1 (x 0.95 = 0.95)
Consequence 2A = 1 (x 0.95 = 0.95) Consequence 2B = 0.01 (x 0.8 = 0.01)
Consequence 3A = 0.4 (x 0.9 = 0.36) Consequence 3B = 0.8 (x 1 = 0.8)
A’s total utility = 1.32 B’s total utility = 1.76
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of this article, but it would be enticing to delve deeper to make the 
method of decision-making more beneficial to public officials.
CONCLUSION
Ethics, like other realities, is grasped through the complex overlapping 
and intermingling of magnitudes, intensities, movements, spaces and 
forms. Ethicists would therefore gain from the advantage in precision and 
generativity which are almost infinite in the mathematical language. It 
should be remembered that philosophy as a discipline is not experimental, 
but rather analytical. Like mathematics, it contributes to knowledge by 
using reasoning and new logical sequences likely to renew our perception 
of the world. Unfortunately, practitioners of ethics usually choose to 
limit their analytical methods to the categories and modes of designating 
specific to natural language.36 They then lock themselves up in very gen-
eral principles that too often lead to ineffective verbiage. This is because 
the syntax of natural languages is very old and mostly related to spatial 
and temporal phenomena reflecting everyday life. This limits its modeling 
and analytical power. In social ethics, issues concerning the aggregation 
of utility and risk assessment are eloquently demonstrated. As dramati-
cally portrayed in the history of physics, natural language is primarily a 
means of communication. Nevertheless, nowadays, social ethics is slow 
to integrate the mathematical tool in its basic training. It emphasizes His-
tory and condemns those who practice it as being mere commentators 
who endlessly repeat the words of the past. If ethics practitioners want 
to change the world instead of remaining passive describers of it, they 
will have to discover new grounds which have already been broken by 
Archimedes’ descendants.
36 For other considerations on the relation between mathematics, ethics and limi-
tations of natural languages, see: Farmer Y. (2010) Topologie and modélisation chez 
René Thom: l’exemple d’un conflit de valeurs en éthique. Philosophiques, 37 (2), pp. 
369-386.
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